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Abstract
This paper assumes that individuals possess private information
both about their abilities and about their valuation of a public good.
Individuals can undertake collective actions on order to manipulate
the tax system and the decision on public good provision. Conse-
quently, an implementable scheme of taxation has to be collectively
incentive compatible. If preferences are additively separable, then an
implementable tax systems has the following properties: (i) tax pay-
ments do not depend on public goods preferences and (ii) there is no
scope for a collective manipulation of public goods preferences. For a
quasilinear economy, the optimal tax system is explicitly characterized.
Keywords: Optimal Taxation, Public Good Provision, Revelation of
Preferences, Information Aggregation.
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This paper introduces the concept of a collectively incentive compatible tax
system as a tool that makes it possible to study two incentive problems
simultaneously. The ﬁrst incentive problem stems from the fact that indi-
viduals have private information on their earning ability. This restricts the
set of admissible tax systems in a way analyzed in the theory of optimal
income taxation, in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971). The second incentive
problem arises because individuals have private information on their valua-
tion of a public good. This yields the classical free-rider problem in public
good provision and restricts the set of admissible provision rules for public
goods.
The joint treatment of these two incentive problems ﬁlls a gap in the theory
of public economics. This gap exists because the normative theory of public
good provision has two separate branches. On the hand, there is the theory
of optimal taxation. This theory assumes that there is a large economy and
that the tax setting institution can be assumed to know the distribution of
characteristics in the economy. It solves for an optimal scheme of taxation
and public good provision under a public sector budget constraint. The
optimal quantity of a public good is determined according to a modiﬁed
version of the Samuelson rule, after Samuelson (1954), which takes the use
of distortionary tax instruments to ﬁnance public good provision into ac-
count.1
In this approach there is no problem of information aggregation. The econ-
omy is large. This justiﬁes the assumption, that the distribution of charac-
teristics is taken to be commonly known. Consequently, there is no need to
elicit individual valuations of public goods.
The second branch of the literature on public goods provision is driven by
this latter problem. I refer to it as the mechanism design approach.2 In the
simplest setting, a benevolent mechanism designer has to choose a provision
rule for a public good and a payment scheme. An optimal decision on public
good provision requires that information on the distribution of preferences
is made available, i.e there is a problem information aggregation.
Such an analysis is typically undertaken for an economy consisting of ﬁnitely
many individuals. Under an optimal provision rule, each single individual
can aﬀect the decision on public good provision and hence the enjoyment of
the public good by all other individuals. Public good provision thus becomes
1Examples of this approach include Atkinson and Stern (1974), Wilson (1991), Boad-
way and Keen (1993), Nava et al. (1996), Sandmo (1998), Hellwig (2005, 2004) and Gaube
(2000, 2005).
2This literature originates from the study of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms, see
Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973). A survey can be found in Laﬀont (1987) or the textbook
of Mas-Colell et al. (1995). Recent contributions to this line of research are Hellwig (2003)
and Norman (2004).
1a rather complex strategic game driven by multilateral externalities.
To summarize this brief overview, the idea that a reasonable criterion for
public good provision requires to collect information on individual valua-
tions of the public good and that this causes an incentive problem, has been
addressed in ﬁnite economies but not in large economies and not in conjunc-
tion with the tax instruments which are used to ﬁnance public expenditures.
The present paper provides a framework that addresses these issues.
At a conceptual level, this raises the question of an appropriate solution
concept. The main issue is whether information aggregation is really an in-
centive problem in a large economy. To see this, suppose there are inﬁnitely
many individuals, each with private information on the own valuation of the
public good. Moreover, assume that the institution that decides on public
good provision uses a revelation game to learn about the distribution of pref-
erences. As the economy is large, no single individual has a direct impact
on the distribution of preferences. Hence, no individual has a reason to hide
his valuation of the public good, implying that information aggregation does
not involve an incentive problem.
The present paper, however, takes a diﬀerent view. It is assumed that in-
dividuals can form coalitions in order to manipulate the decision on public
good provision. Consequently, information on the distribution of public
goods preferences can be acquired only if there is no large group of indi-
viduals who gain from a collective manipulation of announced public goods
preferences. Allocations which do not provoke such strategic manipulations
by groups of agents are henceforth called collectively incentive compatible.
The formal model is based on the environment analyzed in the theory of
optimal income taxation, following Mirrlees (1971). The new assumptions
introduced in this paper are ﬁrst, that individuals do not only have private
information about their ability level but also about their valuation of a pub-
lic good and second, that there is aggregate uncertainty because the joint
cross-section distribution of earning abilities and public goods preferences is
not commonly known.
The characterization of the set of implementable allocation is treated as a
problem of mechanism design in a large economy.3 An allocation consists of
an income tax schedule and a provision rule for public goods. To be imple-
mentable it has to fulﬁll three requirements. First, it has to be budgetary
feasible. Second, it has to be individually incentive compatible (I-IC): From
a single individual’s perspective there is no reason to hide the own character-
istics – taking the announcements of all other individuals in the revelation
game as given. Finally, it has to be collectively incentive compatible (C-IC):
3This approach has been introduced by Hammond (1979) and Guesnerie (1995). See
Hellwig (2004) for a recent contribution.
2No coalition of individuals has an incentive to manipulate the proﬁle of an-
nouncements in order to aﬀect the decision on public good provision, taking
the announcements of individuals outside the coalition as given.
The main result of the paper provides a characterization of individually and
collectively incentive compatible tax systems under the assumption that
individuals’ utility functions are additively separable between private and
public goods. First, the tax system can not use diﬀerences in public goods
preferences as a screening device. Put diﬀerently, individual tax payments
are only a function of ability levels and do not depend on an individual’s
taste for public goods. Second, the individual and the collective dimension of
the incentive problem are also separable in the following sense. C-IC holds
if no coalition of individuals gains from a manipulation of public goods pref-
erences, taking as given that these individuals reveal their earning ability.
Put diﬀerently, there is no need to worry about coalitions that manipulate
the announced proﬁle of earning ability. A revelation of individual ability
levels is in turn ensured by the requirement of I-IC, taking as given that
that there is no collective manipulation of public goods preferences.
This observation proves convenient for a more explicit characterization of
implementable allocations in more speciﬁc environments.4 To illustrate this,
one such application is studied in more detail, namely an economy in which
individuals have quasilinear preferences over the quantity of a public good
and their individual payment obligation.5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the
formal description of the economy. In addition, the example of a quasilinear
economy is used to demonstrate that an optimal scheme of income taxation
and public good provision is in general vulnerable to the formation of manip-
ulating coalitions. In section 3 the solution concept of a collectively incentive
compatible tax system is introduced. This section also contains a discussion
of the related literature on mechanism design problems under coalition for-
mation. Section 4 derives the result that, with separable preferences, a
separation of individual and collective incentive problems is possible. In
Section 5 this observation is used to characterize the optimal I-IC and C-IC
allocation in the quasilinear economy. The last section contains concluding
remarks. All proofs are in the appendix.
4See the applications in Bierbrauer (2006) and Bierbrauer (2005).
5For this environment, Bierbrauer and Sahm (2006) characterize the optimal provi-
sion rule for a public goods under the premise that information on the distribution of
preferences is made available by a voting procedure.
32 The Environment
There is a large set of individuals identiﬁed with the unit interval I = [0,1]
and equipped with measure µ. An individual i ∈ I has a utility function
U deﬁned over the quantity Q ∈ R+ of a non-excludable public good, and
bundles of private goods A ∈ Rl. In addition, utility depends on individual
characteristics. I distinguish a taste parameter θi ∈ Θ, Θ ⊂ R+, to formalize
heterogeneity regarding valuations of the public good and a productivity or
skill parameter wi ∈ W, W ⊂ R+. For brevity, I denote a pair of individual
characteristics (θi,wi) by γi and the set Θ × W by Γ. U is thus written as
U = U(Q,A,γi) .
Example 1 In the theory of optimal income taxation A is a pair (C,Y )
consisting of consumption of private goods C ∈ R+ and eﬀective labour
supply or income Y ∈ R+. In this setting, the productivity parameter
captures individual heterogeneity with respect to the utility loss associated
with a given level of eﬀective labour supply.
When discussing applications, I impose the assumption that the utility func-
tion U is additively separable in the utility contribution of the public good,
depending on the taste parameter θi, and the utility contribution of A, de-
pending on the skill parameter wi.
Assumption 1 The utility function U is additively separable:
U = v(Q,θi) + u(A,wi) .
The assignment of characteristics to individuals is represented by an assign-
ment function γa : I → Γ with image denoted by {γi}i∈I = {(θi,wi)}i∈I. It
is assumed throughout that there is assignment uncertainty; i.e. the function
γa – or equivalently the proﬁle {γi}i∈I – is not commonly known. Instead,
individual i has private information on the parameter γi.
Assumption 2 Almost all assignments γa are measurable functions.
Assumption 2 implies that expressions such as e.g.
µ({i | θi ≤ θ and wi ≤ w}) or µ({i | θi ≤ θ })
are, for any resolution of assignment uncertainty γa, well deﬁned.
In addition to assignment uncertainty, there is aggregate uncertainty refer-
ring to the empirical distribution of individual characteristics in the econ-
omy. From an ex ante perspective there are diﬀerent states of the economy.
4Each such state corresponds to a cross-section distribution of characteristics
and is represented by a cumulative distribution function (cdf) D : Γ → [0,1]
that lists for each γ = (θ,w) the fraction of individuals with characteristics
γi ≤ γ,
D(γ) = µ({i | θi ≤ θ and wi ≤ w}) .
Assumption 3 There is aggregate uncertainty, in the sense that the actual
cross-section distribution of characteristics D in the economy is not com-
monly known. There is a commonly known set D of possible states of the
economy.
The following information about the distribution of characteristics in the
economy is common knowledge. There is aggregate stability regarding the
marginal distribution of productivity parameters.
Assumption 4 There is aggregate stability with respect to the productiv-
ity parameter; i.e. for any D ∈ D there is a commonly known marginal cu-
mulative distribution function F : W → [0,1] with F(w) = µ({i | wi ≤ w }).
Remark 1 At this general level, there is no need to be more speciﬁc on
the relation between randomness at the individual level – i.e. the precise
nature of assignment uncertainty – and Assumptions 3 and 4 on the aggre-
gate structure of the economy. In the literature one often ﬁnds that {γi}i∈I
is taken to be the realization of stochastic process consisting of indepen-
dent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables. In addition, with
appeal to some Law of Large Numbers for Large Economies, any realiza-
tion of this process is assumed to induce an assignment that is consistent
with the assumptions imposed on the aggregate features of the economy. A
mathematical foundation for this approach is provided by Al-Najjar (2004).
The following example is used repeatedly to illustrate the main ideas of this
paper.
2.1 An Example
Let W = [w
¯
, ¯ w] be a compact interval and let F be such that there exists a
density f that is strictly positive on (w
¯
, ¯ w). Let Θ = {θL,θH} with θL < θH.
Aggregate uncertainty is formalized as follows: Denote by p the fraction of
individuals with a high taste parameter, p = µ({i | θi = θH}). While each
individual observes the own taste realization, p is an unknown parameter
between 0 and 1. It is assumed that p is the only source of aggregate
5uncertainty; that is, there exists a bijection between possible values of the
parameter p ∈ [0,1] and the set D of states of the economy. To be more
precise, the following assumptions are imposed.
Assumption 5 The assignment of characteristics to individuals proceeds
sequentially. First, there is a skill assignment wa : W → I. Second, there
is an assignment of taste parameters to skill parameters θa : W → Θ with
image denoted by {θw}w∈W. The interpretation is that for an individual
with productivity level w the taste parameter is given by θw. Skill and taste
assignments are assumed to satisfy the following properties.
i) For any p ∈ [0,1], the proﬁle {θw}w∈W is the realization of an i.i.d.
process of random variables {˜ θw}w∈W.
ii) A Law of Large Numbers applies: almost all realizations of {˜ θw}w∈W





θw dF = pθH + (1 − p)θL .
Remark 2 In Assumption 5 the random taste assignment operates on the
set W of possible skill levels and not directly on the set of individuals I. As
both W and I are continua this does not aﬀect the mathematical structure.
The results of Al-Najjar (2004) remain applicable.
This speciﬁcation has the property that in every state of the economy the
empirical marginal cross-section distribution of the skill parameter and the
empirical marginal cross-section distribution of the taste parameter are in-
dependent. Put diﬀerently, in every state of the economy, the average taste
level is the same on every subinterval of W.6
2.2 The Taxation Principle
A tax system is interpreted as the outcome of a mechanism design problem
under the restriction that allocations have to be anonymous. An anonymous
allocation consists of two mappings, a provision rule for the public good,
Q : D → R+,D 7→ Q(D),
and a menu of private goods bundles
A : D × Γ → Rl,(D,γ) 7→ A(D,γ) .
6A setup that does not use this assumption is the Two-Class Economy analyzed in
Bierbrauer (2005).
6Remark 3 Following Guesnerie (1995) two aspects of anonymity can be
distinguished. There is recipient anonymity as the private goods bundle
dedicated to an individual depends only on that individual’s characteristics
but not on the index i. In addition, there is anonymity in inﬂuence. Neither
the menu {A(D,γ)}γ∈Γ nor the provision level Q(D) change in response
to a permutation of {γi}i∈I that leaves the cross section distribution D
unaﬀected.7
Deﬁnition 1 An anonymous allocation is said to be individually incentive
compatible (I-IC) if
∀D,∀ˆ γ,∀γ : U(Q(D),A(D,γ),γ) ≥ U(Q(D),A(D, ˆ γ),γ) .
It is feasible if for all D ∈ D, the collection [Q(D),{A(D,γ)}γ∈Γ] belongs to
the set of feasible allocations Z.
The individual incentive compatibility conditions are stated for a given D;
that is, they restrict the possibility for a diﬀerential treatment of individuals
only within a given cross-section distribution of characteristics. They do not
place constraints on the ability of an allocation to specify diﬀerent outcomes
for diﬀerent members of D. This is due to the fact that in a continuum
economy any one individual has a mass of zero and hence does not aﬀect
the distribution of characteristics; i.e. there is no impact on the state of the
world as perceived by the mechanism designer. In combination with the
postulate of anonymity this implies in particular, that no single individual
has an impact on public good provision.
Remark 4 It is possible to prove a revelation principle for anonymous al-
locations. Accordingly, the set of anonymous allocations which are imple-
mentable as the outcome of an anonymous game8 in which each individual
has a dominant strategy coincides with the set of I-IC allocations. A more
precise statement and a proof of this revelation principle can be found in
the Appendix.
If one seeks for allocations that can be reached via some anonymous game
form, then Remark 4 allows to restrict attention to anonymous allocations
7Guesnerie (1995) argues that the consideration of anonymous allocations contains no
loss of generality if the proﬁle of characteristics {γi}i∈I is viewed as the realization of an
i.i.d. process of random variables. Under this assumption there is no correlation among
individual characteristics that a mechanism designer could potentially exploit.
8An anonymous game is deﬁned by the property that a player’s payoﬀ depends on the
own action and the own characteristics, while the actions chosen by other players only
enter via their empirical distribution. More details can be found in Kalai (2004).
7which are I-IC and feasible. Moreover, as the following proposition claims
those allocations have the property of being decentralizable.
Deﬁnition 2 A feasible anonymous allocation [Q,A] is called decentraliz-
able if there exists a collection of budget sets {B(D)}D∈D such that
∀γ,∀D : A(D,γ) ∈ argmaxX∈B(D) U(Q(D),X,γ)
Proposition 1 (Taxation Principle) An anonymous allocation is I-IC
and feasible if and only if it is a decentralizable.
A proof can be found in Hammond (1979). According to the taxation princi-
ple, any I-IC and feasible allocation has the property of being decentralizable
via a budget set B(D) that is common for all individuals in the economy,
and vice versa. Consequently, the set of decentralizable allocations is the
relevant object for a study of tax systems. Any tax system generates a de-
centralized allocation, where the budget set B(D) is shaped by the available
tax instruments. The ﬁnal allocation then results from the solution of the
utility maximization problems that individuals face under the given tax sys-
tem. In reverse direction, the taxation principle implies that to each I-IC
allocation one can ﬁnd a corresponding tax system – implicitly deﬁned as
the set of tax instruments that generate the set B(D).
In the theory of optimal income taxation the taxation principle takes a more
concise form as illustrated by the following example.
Example 2 Suppose that A = (C,Y ) as in Example 1. An anonymous
allocation [Q,C,Y ] is said to be feasible if
∀D :
R
Γ Y (D,γ) − C(D,γ) dD = K(Q(D)) ,
where K(·) is a cost function that captures the resource requirement of
public good provision. The allocation [Q,C,Y ] is said to be decentralizable
by an income tax, if there exists a function T : D × R+ → R such that
for all D and for all γ: Consumption equals after tax income: C(D,γ) =
Y (D,γ) − T(D,Y (D,γ)), individuals choose a utility maximizing level of
income subject to the given income tax schedule,
Y (D,γ) ∈ argmaxY U(Q(D),Y − T(D,Y ),Y,γ) ,
and the public sector budget constraint is satisﬁed,
R
Γ T(D,Y (D,γ))dD = K(Q(D)) .
For this environment the taxation principle takes the following form: An
anonymous allocation is I-IC and feasible if and only if it is decentralizable
by an income tax. A proof can be found in the Appendix.
82.3 Taxes must not depend on public goods preferences
If individuals’ utility functions are additively separable, then the tax system
cannot exploit heterogeneity with respect to individuals’ valuations of the
public good.
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. An anonymous allocation is
I-IC if and only if it satisﬁes the following properties:
i) The no discrimination of taste (NDT) property:
∀D,∀w,∀θ,∀θ0 : u(A(D,θ,w),w) = u(A(D,θ0,w),w) .
ii) The individual revelation of productivity (I-RP) property:
∀D,∀θ,∀w,∀w0 : u(A(D,θ,w),w) ≥ u(A(D,θ,w0),w) .
The I-RP property requires that individuals are willing to reveal their earn-
ing ability, taking a truthful announcement of their taste parameter as given.
This is the notion of incentive compatibility that is underlying the literature
on optimal income taxation.
The NDT property says that two individuals who have the same ability
level but diﬀer in their taste parameter must receive the same utility from
private goods consumption under an I-IC allocation. Put diﬀerently, tax
payments of individuals must not depend on their views on the desirability
of public good provision.
Formally, the NDT requirement follows from the fact that individuals take
D and hence the level of public good provision as given. Due to the sep-
arability assumption, the utility contribution of the public good does not
enter individual incentive compatibility constraints; i.e the I-IC conditions
become independent of taste parameters. Consequently, an admissible tax
system can use only individual diﬀerences in productivity levels as a screen-
ing device and must leave all individuals indiﬀerent with respect to possible
taste announcements.
In the following, I will argue that this creates a scope for collective manipu-
lations of taste parameters. Since an I-IC allocation can not undermine the
willingness of individuals to announce false taste parameters, there is room
for collective manipulations in the following sense: a subset of agents with
positive mass can aﬀect the announced distribution of public goods prefer-
ences – even without violating individual incentive constraints. Again, this
is illustrated by means of an example in the next subsection.
92.4 The Example continued
Reconsider the economy described in subsection 2.1. Assume that the utility
function satisﬁes Assumption 1 and, moreover, takes the following quasi-
linear form
U = θQ −
t
w ,
where t is the individual’s contribution to the cost of public good provision.
This utility speciﬁcation captures the idea that less able individuals suﬀer
from a larger utility loss if forced to generate the income that is needed to
meet a given payment obligation t.
U is the cardinal utility function that is relevant for welfare assessments. Its
ordinal properties are equivalently represented by the following monotone
transformation V := wU = θwQ−t. I refer to to the term θw as the eﬀective
valuation of the public good by an individual with characteristics (θ,w).
Recall the information structure speciﬁed in subsection 2.1. Each state of
the economy corresponds to a value for the parameter p that determines the
average valuation of the public good pθH +(1−p)θL. An anonymous alloca-
tion is hence represented by a provision rule for the public good Q : p 7→ Q(p)
and a payment scheme t : (p,θ,w) 7→ t(p,θ,w) that speciﬁes for each state
of the economy the contribution of an individual with characteristics (θ,w)
to the cost of public good provision.
A straightforward application of Proposition 2 yields the observation that
an allocation [Q,t] is I-IC if and only if, for each p all individuals have
the same payment obligation; i.e. for all p and for all (θ,w) and all (θ0,w0),
t(p,θ,w) = t(p,θ0,w0). Moreover, assuming that the cost of public good
provision is given by a strictly increasing and strictly convex per capita cost
function K : Q 7→ K(Q) and adding a resource constraint yields the result
that [Q,t] is I-IC and feasible if and only if the payment scheme t prescribes
equal cost sharing; that is, for all p and for all (θ,w), t(p,θ,w) = K(Q(p)).
These observations allow to represent an individual’s assessment of an allo-
cation rule [Q,t], which is budgetary feasible and incentive compatible, in
the following reduced form,
V (p,θ,w) := θwQ(p) − K(Q(p)) . (1)
In what follows, I consider the choice of an optimal I-IC and feasible alloca-
tion by a benevolent utilitarian planner. The planner evaluates an allocation
from the ex ante perspective, i.e. before the actual value of p is known. For
simplicity, I assume that the planner takes the actual state of the economy
p to be the realization of a random variable ˜ p that is uniformly distributed
on the unit interval [0,1].9 Using the Law of Large Numbers in Assumption
9Throughout I do not impose a common prior assumption. Only the prior beliefs of
the mechanism designer are speciﬁed.





















{¯ v(p)Q(p) − K(Q(p))}dp ,
where λ :=
R
(1/w)f(w)dw is an index of the marginal welfare eﬀect of the
cost of public good provision under equal cost sharing and
¯ v(p) :=
pθH + (1 − p)θL
λ
is the eﬀective utilitarian valuation of the public good.
I will now show that if EW is maximized under the requirements of I-IC and
feasibility only, then the resulting allocation is vulnerable to manipulative
collective actions by groups of individuals who oppose the decision on public
good provision. To see this consider the provision rule Q∗ : p 7→ Q∗(p) that
is chosen by a utilitarian planner who maximizes EW pointwise; i.e. who
maximizes the expression ¯ v(p)Q(p) − K(Q(p)) for every p ∈ [0,1]. This
provision rule is characterized by a continuum of ﬁrst order conditions
∀p : ¯ v(p) = K0(Q∗(p)) .
Under Q∗ individual preferences over the “announced state of the world”
can be represented by the following indirect utility function,
V ∗(p,θ,w) := θwQ∗(p) − K(Q∗(p)) .
It is easily veriﬁed that
V ∗
p (p,θ,w) = Q∗0(p)






< 0 if θw < ¯ v(p) ,
= 0 if θw = ¯ v(p) ,
> 0 if θw > ¯ v(p) .
That is, under provision rule Q∗ an individual prefers a larger level of p –
or equivalently a larger level of public good provision – if and only if the
own eﬀective valuation exceeds the eﬀective utilitarian valuation. Likewise
an individual with an eﬀective valuation below the average prefers to have
a lower quantity of the public good.
These observations imply that groups of individuals would refuse to reveal
their true taste parameters if they could thereby aﬀect the mechanism de-
signer’s perception of p. To see this, consider the set of individuals with a
low taste parameter and a high skill level who have an eﬀective valuation
close to θL ¯ w. Moreover, for the sake of concreteness, assume that these
11individuals share the belief that p is very low.10 Put diﬀerently, these indi-
viduals believe that a vast majority has a low taste realization and that, as
a consequence, their own eﬀective valuations lie above the eﬀective utilitar-
ian valuation. Hence, under Q∗, this group of individuals expects that the
quantity of the public good is too low and would be happy if the mechanism
designer had a larger perception of p. But this implies that these individuals
are better oﬀ if they collectively announce a high taste parameter.
These considerations highlight the following issues: First, a collective de-
viation from the truth may be beneﬁcial for a subset of agents. Second such
a collective deviation is not prevented by individual incentive compatibility.
Given that all high skilled individuals lie about their taste parameter, there
is no incentive for an isolated high skilled individual to reveal his taste pa-
rameter truthfully. Due to the NDT property, this is a systematic feature.
With separable preferences a collective deviation involving taste parameters
is not undermined by individual incentives.11
3 Collective Incentive Compatibility
As the discussion in the preceding subsection has shown, the requirement of
I-IC is not suﬃcient to ensure that an allocation is able to fulﬁll the task
of information aggregation. Under I-IC, incentives for a collective manipu-
lation of the mechanism designer’s perception of the distribution D are not
eliminated. In the following the notion of a collectively incentive compatible
(C-IC) tax system is introduced that does not suﬀer from this problem.
More speciﬁcally, the deﬁnition of collective incentive compatibility that is
given below requires that truth-telling is a dominant strategy for each con-
ceivable coalition. The main advantage of this approach is that the analysis
of coalition formation does not require assumptions on the prior beliefs of
individuals. Moreover, as will be explained below, the focus on dominant
strategies implies that coalition formation can be analyzed as if individuals
had complete information on the state of the economy.
Before the deﬁnition of a C-IC tax system can be stated, I need to deﬁne
a coalition and a subcoalition. For reasons that will become clear, I require
that any potentially manipulating subset of agents must have a ﬁxed min-
imal size  > 0, where  can be arbitrary small. Moreover, a subcoalition
J0 is a subset of a given coalition J that excludes at least an  - mass of
individuals from J.
10This means that ex interim these individuals have prior beliefs that put a lot of
probability mass on values of p which are close to zero.
11A further example for the vulnerability of an optimal I-IC and feasible allocation is
found in Bierbrauer (2005).
12Deﬁnition 3 A coalition J is a subset of agents with µ(J) ≥ , for some
ﬁxed but arbitrary  > 0. A subcoalition J0 of coalition J is a coalition with
the properties J0 ⊂ J and µ(J0) ≤ µ(J) − .
Two implications of this deﬁnition, that are used below, are the following:
i) A coalition J with  ≤ µ(J) < 2 possesses no subcoalition.
ii) Consider a chain ... ⊂ J000 ⊂ J00 ⊂ J0 ⊂ J resulting from a successive
formation of subcoalitions. Any such chain has a ﬁnite length.
The following notation is needed to describe the potential impact of a coali-
tion on the perceived distribution of characteristics. Denote by J, with
typical element J, the set of subsets of I which satisfy µ(J) ≥ . Denote the
true proﬁle of characteristics in J by γJ := {γj}j∈J. Denote the reported
proﬁle by ˆ γJ := {ˆ γj}j∈J. Let the actual distribution of characteristics in the
economy be D ∈ D. Denote the cross section distribution of announcements
induced by ˆ γJ if all individuals not in J report truthfully by ˆ D(ˆ γJ,D) ∈ ∆Γ,
where ∆Γ is the set of cdfs with domain Γ.12
Consider a coalition J with µ(J) ≥ 2. Suppose that J induces state per-
ception ˆ D(ˆ γJ,D) via the proﬁle of announcements ˆ γJ. Suppose that the
members of a subcoalition J0 of J deviate from this proﬁle and report in-
stead according to ˜ γJ0 6= ˆ γJ0. The induced announced distribution of char-
acteristics is denoted by ˆ D(˜ γJ0, ˆ γJ\J0,D).
Deﬁnition 4 A coalition J is said to manipulate an allocation if there exists
D ∈ D, and ˆ γJ 6= γJ with the following properties:
i) Undetectability. The induced distribution is feasible: ˆ D(ˆ γJ,D) ∈ D.
ii) Unanimity. All coalition members are strictly better oﬀ when choosing
to report according to ˆ γJ instead of γJ. ∀j ∈ J:
U(Q( ˆ D),A( ˆ D, ˆ γj),γj) > U(Q(D),A(D,γj),γj) .
iii) Individual Stability. No coalition member departs – unilaterally – from
coalitional behavior. Given the I-IC-constraints, this requires ∀j ∈ J:
U(Q( ˆ D),A( ˆ D, ˆ γj),γj) = U(Q( ˆ D),A( ˆ D,γj),γj) .
iv) Collective Stability. There does not exist a subcoalition J0 ⊂ J, with
an undetectable collective deviation ˜ γJ0 6= ˆ γJ0 that induces a state per-
ception ˆ D(˜ γJ0, ˆ γJ\J0,D) that makes all members of J0 strictly better
12Assumptions 3 and 4 imply that D ⊂ ∆Γ and D 6= ∆Γ.
13oﬀ relative to ˆ D(ˆ γJ,s) (unanimity), prescribes for all its members in-
dividually best responses given the state perception ˆ D(˜ γJ0, ˆ γJ\J0,D)
(individual stability) and is not threatened by further collective ma-
nipulations, which satisfy all these requirements (collective stability).
An allocation is said to be collectively incentive compatible (C-IC) if there
exists no manipulating coalition.
According to this deﬁnition, a coalition considers a collective deviation in re-
sponse to truth-telling of all other individuals. The scope for manipulation is
limited by the requirement that it must not be detectable; i.e. relevant coali-
tional plans need to have the property that it does not become apparent that
a manipulation has occurred. Moreover, coalition members have to agree
unanimously on a deviation and may not use side payments to reach such
an agreement. Finally, a coalition has to meet two stability requirements.
The incentives coalition members face individually must not conﬂict with
the message proﬁle used by the coalition; that is, collective manipulations
are a concern only in so far as they do not conﬂict with I-IC. In addition, a
conceivable collective manipulation has to be such that it does not provoke
the formation of a subcoalition which departs from the original coalitional
plan.
A peculiarity of Deﬁnition 4 is that collective stability of a coalition J is
deﬁned with reference to the collective stability of a subcoalition J0 ⊂ J.
The requirement of a minimal size for coalitions and subcoalitions ensures
that these notions can be traced back to the collective stability of a set of
“smallest” coalitions, those with mass between  and 2.13
The requirement of collective incentive compatibility ensures that the alloca-
tion [Q,A] can be implemented as the outcome of an anonymous revelation
game in such a way that for each coalition J truth-telling is a dominant
strategy in the following sense: for any proﬁle of announcements of individ-
uals not in J, truth-telling is the best stable collective announcement for
individuals in J.14 In Remark 4 it has been claimed that I-IC of an allo-
cation is equivalent to the possibility to implement it as the outcome of an
anonymous revelation game in which each individual possesses a dominant
strategy. The requirement of C-IC is hence commensurate to I-IC in the
sense that both ensure implementability in dominant strategies.
13Bernheim et al. (1986) introduce the notion of a coalition-proof Nash-equilibrium for
games with a ﬁnite number of players. They provide a recursive deﬁnition based on a
deﬁnition of coalition-proofness for games with only one player. The above deﬁnitions of
stability are an adaption of this idea for the present setup.
14Alternatively, C-IC can be framed as a robustness-requirement that ensures incentive
compatibility of collective actions irrespective of the prior beliefs of individuals in the
economy; see Bergemann and Morris (2005) or Kalai (2004).
14The interpretation of these requirements in terms of admissible tax sys-
tems is the following. According to the taxation principle in Proposition 1,
the requirements of anonymity and I-IC are equivalent to the existence of a
tax system that can be used to decentralize an allocation. However, decen-
tralization via the budget set B(D) presumes that the actual state D has
already been determined. The additional requirement of C-IC ensures that
this information is indeed available; that is, under C-IC the tax system does
not rely on information that creates a scope for collective manipulations by
groups of individuals. Put diﬀerently, allocations that are I-IC and C-IC
imply the existence of a tax system and simultaneously allow for information
aggregation.
In the remainder of this section I will explain two aspects of the C-IC re-
quirement in more detail. The last subsection contains a discussion of related
concepts of coalition-proofness that can be found in the literature.
3.1 Oﬀ-the equilibrium tax systems
One might take the view that the requirement of C-IC is too strong in the
sense that there exist alternative ways of achieving a non-manipulable alloca-
tion. For instance, a mechanism designer could use use “oﬀ-the-equilibrium
rewards” for subcoalitions to destabilize potential coalitions. To illustrate
this, suppose that in state D ∈ D, coalition J would want to induce state
perception ˆ D ∈ D using the false announcements in ˆ γJ. Now suppose that
the mechanism designer rewards a further deviation of a subcoalition J0 ⊂ J
to some announced distribution ˜ D, where ˜ D does not belong to the set of
feasible states D. Thereby the initial manipulation of coalition J is under-
mined.15 Moreover it is undermined in a way that is not costly in terms of
the welfare properties of the ﬁnal allocation because the outcome promised
to individuals in J0 under ˜ D is not part of an equilibrium allocation. Hence,
an implicit assumption underlying the requirement of C-IC is that such
“oﬀ-the-equilibrium tax systems” that only serve to destroy collective ma-
nipulations of “equilibrium tax systems” can not be used. While this entails
a loss of generality, it still seems to be a reasonable way of modeling tax
systems.
3.2 Aggregate Uncertainty and Undetectability
Recall how aggregate uncertainty has been formalized by Assumptions 3 and
4. For any w ∈ W, the “share” of individuals with productivity parameter
w is commonly known. By contrast, the “share” of individuals with a taste
parameter θ among those with productivity w, is not commonly known for
all w ∈ W. Finally, those properties of the joint distribution of taste and
skill parameters that are commonly known, determine the structure of the
15A similar reasoning can be found in Boylan (1998).
15set D.
The undetectability requirement in the above deﬁnition of a C-IC tax system
precludes the formation of coalitions which induce an announced distribution
of characteristics that does not belong to D. Implicitly it is thus assumed,
that the mechanism designer can eﬀectively deter those collective manipu-
lations for which it becomes obvious that some set of agents must have been
deviating from the truth.16
The diﬃculty of achieving C-IC depends to a large extent on the assump-
tions on the feasible set D and the mechanism designer’s ability to detect
collective manipulations. To illustrate this, the example in subsections 2.1
and 2.4 is discussed once more.
3.3 The Example continued
Again consider the example discussed in subsections 2.1 and 2.4. Recall
that it is assumed to be commonly known, that the average taste parameter
pθH + (1 − p)θL, is the same on every subset of W. Aggregate uncertainty
stems only from the fact that p itself is an unknown parameter.
One can take the view that if the empirical taste and the empirical skill dis-
tribution satisfy this property of independence almost surely, then basically
any collective manipulation is detectable. Whenever agents from a partic-
ular part of the skill distribution form a manipulating coalition – while all
other agents stick to the truth – this induces an announced distribution of
characteristics which is inconsistent with the commonly known fact that the
average taste level is the same on every subset of W. Consequently, an unde-
tectable manipulation has to be such that the average taste level is aﬀected
on every subinterval of W in the same way. This basically requires that the
whole set of agents I is willing to undertake a collective manipulation. The
only coalition which might potentially undermine an allocation is thus the so
called grand coalition consisting of all agents. This is a perfectly consistent
view on undetectability. It is formalized below as a undetectability in the
strict sense.
With the following alternative notion of undetectability the mechanism can-
not impose as much discipline on potential coalitions. As the realization of
taste parameters is governed by an i.i.d. process of random variables, it may
happen that the average taste level is diﬀerent for diﬀerent subintervals of
W. Even though such an event has probability zero it is not excluded from
the support of the stochastic process {˜ θw}w∈W. This distinction between
supported outcomes and those which arise with strictly positive probability
allows for two diﬀerent versions of the undetectability requirement:
16Note that even if a manipulation becomes apparent, the manipulating individuals are
not yet identiﬁed. The above deﬁnition hence implicitly relies on the assumption, that
the mechanism may punish all individuals harshly in response to an obvious collective lie.
This in turn implies, that no coalition will consider such a collective plan.
16Deﬁnition 5 Consider the application speciﬁed in subsections 2.1 and 2.4.
i) A collective manipulation is weakly undetectable if the induced skill
distribution is given by F.
ii) A collective manipulation is strictly undetectable if the induced skill
distribution is given by F and the induced taste distribution is such
that average taste level is the same on every subinterval of the skill
distribution.
Below, in section 5, the set of allocations which are not only I-IC but also
C-IC is characterized for this environment. As will become clear, which
version of undetectability is used, has a huge impact on the set of admissible
allocations.
3.4 Related Concepts of Coalition-Proofness
The requirement of C-IC uses the notion of a coalition-proof Nash equilib-
rium that has been developed by Bernheim et al. (1986). These authors
propose a reﬁnement of the Nash equilibrium concept for games of com-
plete information. As in this paper, the incentives coalition members face
individually must not conﬂict with the action proﬁle used by the coalition
and, moreover, a conceivable collective manipulation has to be such that it
does not provoke the formation of a further subcoalitions that depart from
the initial coalitional plan (where a potentially deviating subcoalition would
again have to meet these stability requirements.)
To relate their solution concept for games of complete information to the
setting of this paper, the requirement of C-IC can be interpreted as follows.
Suppose that, for some reason, the actual state of the economy D is com-
monly known among all individuals and that the mechanism designer is the
only uninformed party. Still, the mechanism designer uses the revelation
game to learn the actual state of the economy and to choose the level of
public good provision Q(D) and the menu of private goods bundles B(D).
The revelation game has thus become a game of complete information.17
Moreover, each D ∈ D gives rise to a diﬀerent complete information game.
With this interpretation the requirement of C-IC can be stated as follows.
C-IC holds if and only if in each such complete information game truth-
telling is a stable best response for each coalition, given that all individuals
outside the coalition tell the truth.
The insistence on stability of coalitions with respect to the formation of sub-
coalitions distinguishes the present paper from some recent contributions to
17Moore (1992) provides a survey of implementation problems in environments with
complete information.
17the literature on mechanism design problems under the possibility of coali-
tion formation. In a series of papers Laﬀont and Martimort (1997, 1999,
2000) incorporate a sequential Bayesian game of coalition formation into a
mechanism design problem. These authors however only consider collective
manipulations by the grand coalition. By contrast, Demange and Guesnerie
(2001) allow for the formation of coalitions smaller than the grand coalition.
As Laﬀont and Martimort they do not require stability with respect to the
formation of subcoalitions. Instead they are concerned with concepts of the
core in games of incomplete information without aggregate uncertainty.
4 Separability
In this section the set of allocations that are feasible, I-IC and C-IC is
analyzed under the assumption that the utility function U is additively
separable. This allows to establish a property which proves very useful in
applications: The diﬀerent incentive concerns can be separated. The re-
quirement of I-IC deals with the resolution of pure assignment uncertainty
in the proﬁle of skill parameters; i.e. it allows to solve the screening problem
of identifying individual skill levels within a given cross-section distribution
F. The postulate of C-IC is concerned with problem of information aggre-
gation which arises due to the aggregate uncertainty in the joint distribution
of skill and taste parameters. It turns out that, in order to ensure C-IC, it
suﬃces to eliminate incentives for a collective manipulation of taste param-
eters. There is no need to worry about collective manipulations of reported
skill parameters.
Deﬁnition 6 A utility allocation is a mapping ˜ U : (D,γ) 7→ ˜ U(D,γ). A
utility allocation ˜ U is said to be implementable if there exists an anonymous
allocation [Q,A], which is feasible, I-IC and C-IC and such that:
∀D,∀γ : ˜ U(D,γ) = U(Q(D),A(D,γ),γ) .
It will prove helpful to have an own terminology for coalitional manipulations
which are based on a false report of taste parameters but which are truthful
with respect to the reported skill parameters. A typical message proﬁle of
a manipulating coalition J which is such that, ∀j ∈ J, the reported skill
parameter ˆ wj is equal to the true skill parameter wj is henceforth called
a partial taste manipulation and denoted by ˆ γ
p
J. To emphasize that some
manipulation ˆ γJ is not partial, I write ˆ γJ = [ ˆ wJ, ˆ θJ] with ˆ wJ 6= wJ.
18Deﬁnition 7
i) A coalition J is said to possess a partial taste manipulation if there ex-
ists D ∈ D and an undetectable partial manipulation ˆ γ
p
J that induces a
state perception ˆ D(ˆ γ
p
J,D), which makes all members of J strictly bet-
ter oﬀ relative to D (unanimity), prescribes for all its members taste
announcements which are individually a best response in conjunction
with a truthful skill announcement under state perception ˆ D(ˆ γ
p
J,D)
(individual stability), and is not threatened by further partial taste
manipulations of subcoalitions, which satisfy all these requirements
(collective stability).
An allocation is said to have the collective revelation of taste (C-RT)
property if there does not a exist a coalition with a partial taste ma-
nipulation.
ii) A utility allocation is partially implementable if there exists an anony-
mous allocation [Q,A], which is feasible, I-IC, has the C-RT property
and is such that:
∀D,∀γ : ˜ U(D,γ) = U(Q(D),A(D,γ),γ) .
Obviously, if an allocation is C-IC, then it has also the C-RT property. As
a consequence, the set of implementable utility allocations is a subset of the
set of partially implementable allocations. The following Lemma shows that
the converse inclusion holds true as well. Hence, it justiﬁes an analysis of
allocations which possess only the C-RT property.
Lemma 1 Under assumptions 1 - 4, the set of implementable utility allo-
cations is equal to the set of partially implementable utility allocations.
The proof is based on the observation that under aggregate stability with
respect to the distribution of skill parameters, any conceivable undetectable
collective manipulation which involves both taste and skill parameters can
be mimicked by a partial manipulation which involves only reported taste
parameters. Intuitively, any manipulation has to be undetectable. Hence,
whenever a subset of agents J manipulates via some ˆ γJ = [ ˆ wJ, ˆ θJ] with
ˆ wJ 6= wJ, this manipulation has to be such that the resulting distribution of
announcements ˆ D has a marginal skill distribution which is equal to F. But
this implies that coalition J can induce ˆ D as well by a suitably chosen partial
taste manipulation. As a consequence, it suﬃces to exclude the possibility
of partial taste manipulations in order to establish the C-IC property.
The results in Lemmas 2 and 1 imply that, under assumptions 1-4, attention
can be restricted to the set of feasible allocations which satisfy I-RP, NDT
and C-RT. These observations are summarized in the following Theorem.
19Proposition 3 Under assumptions 1-4, any implementable utility alloca-
tion is also implementable via an allocation [Q,A] that satisﬁes the following
properties: I-RP, NDT, C-RT and feasibility.
In Proposition 2 it was established that an allocation that is decentralizable
by a tax system needs to be feasible, must not discriminate between indi-
viduals who diﬀer in their views on public goods but are otherwise identical
(NDT-property), and, ﬁnally, has to ensure that individuals are willing to
reveal their earning ability (I-RP-property). These are the constraints that
are familiar from the theory of optimal income taxation.
According to Proposition 3 one set of constraints has to be added if there
is uncertainty about the distribution of preferences in the economy and in-
dividuals can form coalitions in order to manipulate the tax system and
the provision rule for public goods. These C-RT constraints ensure that no
group of agents gains from a collective lie on their taste parameter.
Form a more general perspective this result can be interpreted as follows.
The constraints analyzed in the theory of optimal taxation are concerned
with individual behavior under a given tax system. These constraints re-
main relevant in the present setting with aggregate uncertainty. In addition,
there is a set of “political economy constraints” which addresses the ability
of individuals to form interest groups if, prior to a decision on public good
provision, information on preferences has to be acquired.
The C-RT constraints may seem rather opaque at the present level of ab-
straction. It is not obvious how to represent them by a well-deﬁned set of
constraints that could, for instance, be included in an exercise of solving
for an optimal constrained eﬃcient allocation. To illustrate the impact of
the C-RT property the next section returns to the example discussed in
subsections 2.1, 2.4 and 3.3.
5 The Example continued
This section returns to the application already discussed in subsections 2.1,
2.4 and 3.3. For this environment the set of allocations that are feasible,
I-IC and C-IC is explicitly characterized in the following. Finally, I brieﬂy
discuss the properties of optimal allocations that meet all these criteria.
By Proposition 3 attention is restricted to allocations [Q,t] that satisfy I-
RP, NDT, feasibility and the C-RT property. As has already been observed
in subsection 2.4, the ﬁrst three requirements are equivalent to the payment
scheme t being such that the cost of public good provision is shared equally
among all individuals, for every state p of the economy. Consequently, the
remaining task is to characterize the provision rules Q : p 7→ Q(p) that yield
the C-RT property under such a payment scheme. To achieve this, the two
20versions of the undetectability requirement, that have been introduced in
Deﬁnition 5 have to be distinguished.
5.1 Undetectability in the strict sense
Recall that under undetectability in the strict sense the mechanism designer
infers the actual value of the parameter p from a proﬁle of reports {ˆ γi}i∈I =
{(ˆ θi, ˆ wi)}i∈I and is able to deter any manipulation such that the reported
average taste level is diﬀerent on diﬀerent subintervals of W.
Proposition 4 Suppose a manipulation is called undetectable if it is strictly
undetectable in the sense of Deﬁnition 5. Any pair [Q,t] that satisﬁes equal
cost sharing also satisﬁes the C-RT property if there do not exist p and p0
such that,
∀w,∀θ : V (p,θ,w) > V (p0,θ,w) . (2)
Under undetectability in the strict sense basically any provision rule Q :
p 7→ Q(p) is implementable if accompanied by equal cost sharing. The only
additional restriction imposed by C-RT is that there must not exist a state
of the world p such that all individuals unanimously agree that there exists a
preferred outcome of the revelation game.18 This implies in particular, that
provision rule Q∗(p) which maximizes EW pointwise, is implementable.
5.2 Undetectability in the weak sense
Under undetectability in the weak sense, an inconsistency of average taste
levels on diﬀerent subintervals of W is a possible event. The following as-
sumption speciﬁes how the mechanism designer responds to such an event.
Assumption 6 The mechanism designer’s perception of p is given by µ({i |
ˆ θi = θH}), where ˆ θi is the taste announcement of individual i in the revela-
tion game.19
According to Assumption 6, the mechanism designer takes the population
share of individuals with a high taste parameter as the state of the economy.
18This is a suﬃcient condition. (2) implies that there does not exist a partial taste
manipulation for the grand coalition of all agents which satisﬁes Undetectability, Unanimity
and Individual Stability.
19Measurability of the set {i | ˆ θi = θH} is again ensured with reference to Al-Najjar
(2004). In his model of a large economy I is a countable set of inﬁnitely many individuals
and the set {i | ˆ θi = θH} is measurable with respect to an appropriate generalization of
the counting measure.
21Put diﬀerently, the mechanism designer chooses provision level Q(p) when-
ever he observes that µ({i | ˆ θi = θH}) is equal to p.20 Consequently, under
assumption 6 there is an obvious channel along which a coalition might
manipulate an allocation. Any partial taste manipulation that aﬀects the
population share of individuals who announce a high taste parameter has
an eﬀect on the level of public good provision. In particular, this implies
that any partial taste manipulation that aﬀects the average taste level on
some subinterval of W becomes eﬀective. The following proposition derives
the implications of this property for the set of implementable allocations.
Proposition 5 Suppose that assumption 6 applies. Consider an allocation
[Q,t] with equal cost sharing. [Q,t] has the C-RT property for any minimal
coalition size  if and only if the following properties are satisﬁed.
i) Q is a non-decreasing function of p.
ii) V (p,θL, ¯ w) is non-increasing and V (p,θH, ¯ w) is non-decreasing in p.
The “if-part” in the proposition follows from the observations that, under
a non-decreasing provision rule, V (p,θL, ¯ w) is non-increasing in p only if
an individual with eﬀective valuation θL ¯ w always desires a small provision
level over a large provision level. This implies that the same is true for
any individual with an eﬀective valuation θLw ≤ θL ¯ w. As a consequence,
no individual with a low taste realization is willing to join a manipulating
coalition that attempts to achieve a larger perception of the average taste
parameter p, or, equivalently, a larger quantity of the public good. Analo-
gously one shows that no individual with a high taste realization wants to
achieve a smaller perception of p. Consequently, even with the opportunity
to undertake manipulative collective actions, individuals cannot to better
than to reveal their taste parameter.
The proof of the “only if-part” is based on the observation that whenever
property i) or property ii) is violated, then there exists some small  such
that the C-RT property fails. For instance, as shown in the appendix, if
there exist p0 and p with p0 − p =  and Q(p0) < Q(p), then there exists a
small coalition of individuals with a low taste realization that tries to induce
the outcome Q(p0) if the true state is p, or a coalition of high taste individ-
uals that aims at Q(p) if the true state is p0. Hence, the C-RT property
holds for any small  only if properties i) and ii) are fulﬁlled.
Using Proposition 5 it is easily veriﬁed that Q∗, the welfare maximizing
20The provision rule Q can thus be viewed as resulting from a voting procedure. To see
this, interpret a high (low) taste announcement as a vote in favor of a large (small) level of
public good provision. In this sense, the provision rule p 7→ Q(p) speciﬁes a provision level
for each conceivable vote distribution; see Bierbrauer and Sahm (2006) for more details.
22provision rule under equal cost sharing, is not part of an implementable
allocation. For instance, as has already been discussed in subsection 2.4,
there exists a range of small values of p such that the indirect utility func-
tion under Q∗, V ∗(p,θL, ¯ w), is strictly increasing in p.
To see that the requirement of C-RT can aﬀect the properties of the optimal
provision rule very drastically, suppose that the parameters of the model are
such that θL ¯ w > θHw
¯
; i.e. an individual with a very low skill level and a
high taste parameter has an eﬀective valuation of the public good which
is smaller than the one of an individual with a very high skill level and a
low taste parameter.21 It is easily veriﬁed that only a constant provision
rule satisﬁes the C-RT property.22 Put diﬀerently, the C-RT requirement is
met only if information aggregation plays no role. In this case, the optimal
provision rule is characterized by the condition Q(p) = Q∗(1
2) for all p.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has introduced the notion of a collective incentive compatible tax
system. Such a tax system acquires private information of individuals on
their preferences in a way that does not leave scope for collective manipula-
tions.
The theory of optimal taxation has traditionally been concerned with an
optimal use of a given set of tax instruments that takes the behavioral
responses of individuals to changes in the tax system into account. The
additional requirement of collective incentive compatibility captures that in-
dividuals may also respond collectively to the tax policy they are confronted
with. One might thus hope that the study of collective incentive compatible
tax system provides a link between the normative approach in the theory of
optimal taxation and the ﬁeld of political economics.
However, the deﬁnition of a collectively incentive compatible allocation as
such is rather involved and does not immediately provide a well deﬁned set
of constraints. The approach adopted in this paper (and as well in Bier-
brauer (2005)) has thus been to look at a more structured environment in
which this requirement can be represented by a tractable set of inequality
constraints.
The question whether there is an alternative to this problem-speciﬁc ap-
proach which yields a more general characterization of individually and col-
lectively incentive compatible allocations is left to future research.
21For the optimal provision rule under the assumption θL¯ ≤θHw
¯
, the reader is referred
to Bierbrauer and Sahm (2006). Even though that paper is concerned voting mechanisms
it arrives at the same characterization of implementable provision rules as Proposition 5.
22To see this, let p
0 > p. Property i) in Proposition 5 implies Q(p
0) ≥ Q(p). Property
ii) implies that θHw
¯
(Q(p
0) − Q(p)) ≥ K(Q(p
0)) − K(Q(p)) ≥ θL ¯ w. With θL ¯ w > θHw
¯
the
only way to satisfy all these conditions is to have Q(p) = Q(p
0).
23A Appendix
Statement and Proof of Revelation Principle
An anonymous mechanism M is a game form consisting of a message space
R, a provision rule for the public good and a menu of consumption-income
combinations. To describe these functions denote by ∆R the set of cumula-
tive distribution functions (cdfs) on R and denote a typical element of ∆R
by ρ. An anonymous mechanism is deﬁned by the mappings:
QM : ∆R → R+, ρ 7→ QM(ρ) ,
AM : ∆R × R → R2
+, (ρ,r) 7→ AM(ρ,r) .
A direct anonymous mechanism ¯ M is an anonymous mechanism which sat-
isﬁes R = Γ and is summarized by the functions
Q
¯ M : ∆Γ → R+, D 7→ Q
¯ M(D) ,
A
¯ M : ∆Γ × Γ → R2
+, (D,γ) 7→ A
¯ M(D,γ) .
Note that the domain of a direct anonymous mechanism does not coincide
with the one of an anonymous allocation deﬁned in the body of the text.
The reason is that an anonymous allocation speciﬁes the level of public good
provision Q and the menu of consumption-income pairs A only for cdfs which
belong to the feasible set D. By contrast, a direct anonymous mechanism
speciﬁes an outcome of the game for each distinguishable action proﬁle, that
is, for each distribution of announcements in ∆Γ.
Consider the game induced by an anonymous mechanism M. A strategy s for
an agent assigns a report to each possible value of individual characteristics.
Formally:
s : Γ → R : r = s(γ) .
Denote the set of possible strategies by S.
The game induced by anonymous mechanism M has an equilibrium in dom-
inant strategies if there exists a mapping s∗ such that ∀γ, ∀ρ ∈ ∆R and
∀s ∈ S:
U(QM(ρ),AM(ρ,s∗(γ)),γ) ≥ U(QM(ρ),AM(ρ,s(γ)),γ) .
In words: Each type γ has a best response s∗(γ), which applies indepen-
dently of the behavior of others, i.e. which is optimal for all ρ ∈ ∆R.
An anonymous mechanism M implements an anonymous allocation in dom-
inant strategies if the game induced by M has an equilibrium in dominant
strategy s∗ which satisﬁes ∀γ and ∀D ∈ D:
Q(D) = QM(ρ∗(D)) and A(D,γ) = AM(ρ∗(D),s∗(γ)) ,
24where ρ∗(D) is the distribution of reports generated by s∗ if the state of the
economy is D. Put diﬀerently ρ∗(D) is the distribution on R induced by
the message proﬁle {s∗(γi)}i∈I if the cdf that corresponds to the proﬁle of
characteristics in {γi}i∈I is D.
Consider the game induced by a direct anonymous mechanism ¯ M. Truth-
telling is a strategy deﬁned by s(γ) = γ for all γ ∈ Γ. Truth-telling by all




¯ M(D,γ),γ) ≥ U(Q
¯ M(D),A
¯ M(D, ˆ γ),γ) . (3)
An anonymous allocation is truthfully implementable in dominant strate-
gies if there exists a direct anonymous mechanism ¯ M that implements it
such that truth-telling is a dominant strategy; i.e. truthful implementation
requires that truth-telling by all agents is an equilibrium in dominant strate-
gies in the game induced by ¯ M, and in addition ∀γ and ∀D ∈ D:
Q(D) = Q
¯ M(D) and A(D,γ) = A
¯ M(D,γ) . (4)
Lemma 2 An anonymous allocation rule is I-IC if and only if it is truthfully
implementable.
Proof The if-part follows from substituting the equations in (4) into the in-
equalities in (3), for D ∈ D. This yields the deﬁnition of an I-IC allocation.
To prove the only if-part, suppose that the pair [Q,A] is an I-IC anony-
mous allocation rule. It has to be shown that there exists a direct anony-
mous mechanism [Q
¯ M,A
¯ M] which implements [Q,A]. This direct anony-
mous mechanism has to be such that the incentive structure is preserved,
i.e. such that truth-telling is a dominant strategy. It can for instance be
constructed as follows. For all γ ∈ Γ and all D ∈ D choose [Q
¯ M,A
¯ M] such
that (4) holds. For all D ∈ ∆Γ\D and γ ∈ Γ, let Q(D) = constant and
A(D,γ) = constant.
Proposition 6 (Revelation Principle) An anonymous allocation is im-
plementable if and only if it is truthfully implementable.
Proof The if-part is trivial. Suppose [Q,A] is implementable by some
mechanism M. Then there exists a function s∗ such that ∀γ,∀ˆ γ,∀D ∈ D:
U(QM(ρ∗(D)),AM(ρ∗(D),s∗(γ)),γ) ≥ U(QM(ρ∗(D)),AM(ρ∗(D),s∗(ˆ γ)),γ) .
(In words: In a dominant strategy equilibrium, the following has to be
true. The actions prescribed by the equilibrium strategy s∗ are such that no
25type wants to deviate to an action prescribed for another type, taking the
distribution over equilibrium actions as given.) and such that ∀γ,∀D ∈ D:
Q(D) = QM(ρ∗(D)) and A(D,γ) = AM(ρ∗(D),s∗(γ)) .
Combining those statements yields the deﬁnition of truthful implementabil-
ity or equivalently of an I-IC anonymous allocation.
Proof of Taxation Principle in Example 2.
”⇐=”: Consider a feasible anonymous allocation. Suppose it is an income
tax but not I-IC. Then there exist γ, ˆ γ and D such that
U(Q(D),A(D,γ),γ) < U(Q(D),A(D, ˆ γ),γ) .
Using that for all γ, A(D,γ) = [Y (D,γ) − T(D,Y (D,γ)),Y (D,γ)], this is
equivalent to
U(Q(D),Y (D,γ) − T(D,Y (D,γ)),Y (D,γ),γ)
< U(Q(D),Y (D, ˆ γ) − T(D,Y (D, ˆ γ)),Y (D, ˆ γ),γ) .
But this contradicts that ∀D,∀γ:
Y (D,γ) ∈ argmaxY U(Q(D),Y − T(D,Y ),Y,γ)
”=⇒”: Consider a feasible and I-IC allocation and construct T as follows:
i) For any x such that there is D and γ with Y (D,γ) = x deﬁne T(D,x)
by the equation23
T(D,x) = Y (D,γ) − C(D,γ) .
Obviously, this choice ensures that under T, consumption equals after
tax income and that budget balance holds.
ii) For all other levels of Y set T(D,x) = x.24
23Note that his equation uniquely determines T(D,x). If not, one had, for given D,
diﬀerent consumption levels corresponding to the same income requirement; hence a con-
tradiction to individual incentive compatibility, assuming monotonicity of preferences.
24It is implicitly assumed that, for any agent, zero consumption implies a utility level of
−∞ and that hence the corresponding Y is never chosen, whenever there is an alternative
with positive consumption available.
26Now suppose this function T does not satisfy the property that ∀D,∀γ:
Y (D,γ) ∈ argmaxY U(Q(D),Y − T(D,Y ),Y,γ)
Then there exist γ, ˆ γ and D such that
U(Q(D),Y (D,γ) − T(D,Y (D,γ)),Y (D,γ),γ)
< U(Q(D),Y (D, ˆ γ) − T(D,Y (D, ˆ γ)),Y (D, ˆ γ),γ) .
or using that for all γ, A(D,γ) = [Y (D,γ) − T(D,Y (D,γ)),Y (D,γ)],
U(Q(D),A(D,γ),γ) < U[Q(D),A(D, ˆ γ),γ] .
This contradicts I-IC.
Proof of Proposition 2. To proof the only if-part note that, because
preferences satisfy Assumption 1, the NDT-U property is an implication
of I-IC. Obviously I-RP is also an implication of I-IC. To prove the if-
part, suppose an allocation rule, such that the NDT-U and the I-RP prop-
erty hold, is not I-IC. Then there exist (θ,w) and (ˆ θ, ˆ w) and D such that
u(A(D,θ,w),w) < u(A(D, ˆ θ, ˆ w),w). Using NDT-U and I-RP one has:
u(A(D, ˆ θ, ˆ w),w) = u(A(D,θ, ˆ w),w) ≤ u(A(D,θ,w),w) .
Hence, a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 1. It has to be shown that any partially implementable
utility allocation is implementable. Suppose to the contrary that there exists
a partially implementable utility allocation ˜ U, which is not implementable.
i) Denote by [Q,A] the feasible, I-IC and C-RT allocation which par-
tially implements ˜ U. By hypothesis ˜ U is not implementable. Hence,
there must exist D and a coalition J and a manipulation ˆ γJ = [ ˆ wJ, ˆ θJ]
with ˆ wJ 6= wJ such that, by Undetectability, ˆ D(ˆ γJ,D) ∈ D and,
27∀i ∈ J, by Individual Stability and Unanimity
v(Q( ˆ D(ˆ γJ,D)),θi) + u(A( ˆ D(ˆ γJ,D), ˆ θi, ˆ wi),wi)
= v(Q( ˆ D(ˆ γJ,D)),θi) + u(A( ˆ D(ˆ γJ,D),θi,wi),wi)
> v(Q(D),θi) + u(A(D,θi,wi),wi)
(5)
and such that collective stability holds.
ii) Claim. The coalition J can induce the announced distribution ˆ D(ˆ γJ,D)
also via some partial taste manipulation ˆ γ
p
J.
Proof. There is aggregate stability with respect to the marginal distri-
bution of skill parameters. Hence, any undetectable manipulation ˆ γJ
with ˆ wJ 6= wJ has to be consistent with the commonly known skill dis-
tribution F. The manipulation of J presumes that all individuals not
in J reveal their characteristics truthfully. Hence, to be undetectable,
ˆ γJ has to be such that the distribution of skill announcements within
coalition J is equal to the true skill distribution within coalition J. But
this implies that the outcome achieved via ˆ γJ is also induced if all mem-
bers of J reveal their skill parameter truthfully and choose a suitable
proﬁle of announced taste parameters. I.e. for given ˆ γJ with ˆ wJ 6= wJ,
there exists ˆ γ
p
J with ˆ wJ = wJ such that ˆ D(ˆ γJ,D) = ˆ D(ˆ γ
p
J,D).
iii) Claim. The partial taste manipulation ˆ γ
p
J deﬁned with reference to ˆ γJ
in ii) satisﬁes Individual Stability and Unanimity.
Proof. ˆ γ
p
J is a partial taste manipulation. Under the separability
assumption 1, I-IC implies the NDT property. Hence, any partial
manipulation satisﬁes Individual Stability. Unanimity follows from
ˆ D(ˆ γJ,D) = ˆ D(ˆ γ
p
J,D) and the inequality in (5).
iv) If ˆ γ
p
J was collectively stable with respect to partial taste manipulations
by subcoalitions of J, then this would contradict, the C-RT property
of utility allocation ˜ U. Hence, I assume in the following that ˆ γ
p
J is
not collectively stable with respect to partial taste manipulations by
subcoalitions of J. I.e. if the true distribution of characteristics in
the economy is D and coalition J has induced the announced dis-
tribution ˆ D(ˆ γJ,D), then there exists a subcoalition J0 of J with a
partial taste manipulation ˜ γ
p
J0 6= ˆ γ
p





J\J0,D) ∈ D (Undetectability), which is strictly preferred by
all members of J0 relative to ˆ D(ˆ γJ,D) (Unanimity), is individually
stable and does not provoke partial taste manipulations by further
subcoalitions (collective stability).
28v) Claim. It has to be true that the partial taste manipulation ˜ γ
p
J0 by
subcoalition J0 characterized in iv) is not collectively stable with re-
spect to all manipulations ¯ γJ00 6= ˜ γJ00 with ¯ wJ 6= wJ by subcoalitions
J00 of J0.
Proof. Suppose otherwise. Then this partial taste manipulation ˜ γ
p
J0
could be used by the set J0 to manipulate the initial manipulation of
allocation [Q,A] by coalition J via ˆ γJ in step i), thereby contradicting
the collective stability of this manipulation.
vi) The reasoning established so far has a recursive structure: The start-
ing point was in step i) an allocation [Q,A], which is not vulnerable
by partial taste manipulations but by a joint manipulations ˆ γJ of both
taste and skill parameters. In steps ii)-v) it has been shown that this
implies the existence of a subcoalition J0 of J which possess a partial
taste manipulation ˜ γ
p
J0 which does not provoke further partial taste
manipulations by subcoalitions of J0 but further joint manipulations
of both taste and skill parameters by subcoalitions of J0.
Now the reasoning in steps i) - v) can be applied again to show that
this implies the existence of a subcoalition J00 of J0 which possess a
partial taste manipulation but provokes further joint manipulations of
both taste and skill parameters by subcoalitions of J00 etc.
However, as a consequence of deﬁnition 3, any chain of successive for-
mation of subcoalitions has a ﬁnite length. Hence, after a ﬁnite number
of repeated applications of the reasoning in steps i) - v) one ends up
with a situation in which a subcoalition Jx of minimal size – that is, Jx
possesses no further subcoalitions – possess a joint manipulations of
both taste and skill parameters but not a partial taste manipulation.
A last application of steps ii) and iii) then yields a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4. If (2) holds, then there is no coalition which
is willing to aﬀect the average taste level on all subintervals of W. Any
coalition which aﬀects the average taste level only on some subintervals of
W is detected.
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof follows from Lemmas 3 – 6 below.
Lemma 3 Suppose that assumption 6 applies. Let the minimal coalition
size  be close to zero. If an allocation [Q,t] with equal cost sharing satisﬁes
the C-RT property, then Q(p0) ≥ Q(p) for any pair p0,p ∈ (0,1) with  <
p0 − p ≤ 2.
29Proof Consider a pair p0,p ∈ (0,1) that satisﬁes  < p0 − p ≤ 2. If  is
suﬃciently small, then there exists some skill interval [w1,w2] ⊂ W, with
θHw1 > θLw2 and the following property: under assumption 5, for all p,
almost surly, there exist coalitions JL ⊂ I and JH ⊂ I such that:
i) All members of JL and JH have a skill parameter within [w1,w2].
Moreover, for all i ∈ JL, θi = θL and for all i ∈ JH, θi = θH.
ii) Both coalitions are of equal size, possess no subcoalitions and satisfy
p0 − p = µ(JL) = µ(JH) .
Suppose ﬁrst that the true average taste parameter is given by p. As [Q,t]









Suppose to the contrary that there does not exist such an i ∈ JL. Then if all
individuals in JL announce a high taste parameter this yields a partial taste
manipulation which satisﬁes weak undetectability, unanimity, individual sta-
bility, because due to the NDT property individuals are willing to announce
any taste parameter, and collective stability, as JL has no subcoalition. Now
suppose that the true aggregate taste level is given by p0. Analogously, there









Combining the inequalities (6) and (7) yields:
(θHwj − θLwi)(Q(p0) − Q(p)) ≥ 0 .
By construction, for all wi,wj ∈ [w1,w2], θHwj − θLwi > 0. Hence, it has
to be true that Q(p0) ≥ Q(p).
Lemma 4 Suppose that assumption 6 applies. Let the minimal coalition
size  be close to zero. If an allocation [Q,t] with equal cost sharing satisﬁes
C-RT, then: for all w ∈ W, and for any pair p0,p ∈ (0,1) with  < p0−p ≤ 2,
V (p0,θL,w) ≤ V (p,θL,w) and V (p0,θH,w) ≥ V (p,θH,w).
Proof Without loss of generality, suppose that there exist p0 and p with
 < p0 − p ≤ 2 and w ∈ W such that V (p,θH,w) > V (p0,θH,w). As
 is small, there exists an interval [w1,w2] ⊂ W with w1 ≤ w ≤ w2 and
30w1 < w2 and a coalition JH with the following properties: For all i ∈ JH,
wi ∈ [w1,w2] and θi = θH and, moreover, µ(JH) = p0 − p. Obviously, if
the true average taste parameter equals p, this coalition possesses a partial
taste manipulation. This contradicts the C-RT property of [Q,t].
As a consequence of Lemmas 3 and 4, whenever the provision rule Q is such
that for some pair p0,p with p < p0 one has Q(p) > Q(p0) or, V (p0,θL, ¯ w) >
V (p,θL, ¯ w) or V (p0,θH,w
¯
) < V (p,θH,w
¯
), then there exists a value for the
minimal coalition size  such that the C-RT property is violated.
Lemma 5 If for any w ∈ W, V (p,θL,w) is non-increasing and V (p,θL,w)
is non-decreasing in p then the C-RT property is implied, for any minimal
coalition size  > 0.
Proof Suppose that [Q,t] does not have the C-RT property. Then there
exists a level of the true aggregate taste parameter p and a coalition J with
a partial taste manipulation which induces an announced aggregate taste
level of p0 6= p. Without loss of generality, assume that p0 > p. Suppose
that J contains an individual with a low taste parameter. Due to the una-
nimity property, this individual is made strictly better oﬀ by this partial
taste manipulation. This contradicts the assumption that V (p,θL, ¯ w) is
non-increasing in p. Now suppose that J contains only of individuals with
a high taste parameter. If the true aggregate taste level is p and individu-
als in J misreport their taste parameter, this cannot induce an announced
aggregate taste level exceeding p.
Lemma 6 Suppose that assumption 6 applies. Consider an allocation [Q,t]
with equal cost sharing. Let Q be a non-decreasing function of p. Then, the
C-RT property holds if V (p,θL, ¯ w) is non-increasing in p, and V (p,θH,w
¯
)
is non-decreasing in p.
Proof If V (p,θL, ¯ w) is non-increasing in p, one has for all p and all p0 with
p0 ≥ p that
θL ¯ w(Q(p0) − Q(p)) ≤ K(Q(p0)) − K(Q(p)) .
As Q is non-decreasing in p, this implies that ∀w ∈ W,
θLw(Q(p0) − Q(p)) ≤ K(Q(p0)) − K(Q(p)) .
31Hence, for all w, V (p,θL,w) is non-increasing in p. Analogously one shows
that if V (p,θH,w
¯
) is non-decreasing in p, this implies that, for all w V (p,θH,w)
is non-decreasing in p. Using Lemma 5 this establishes the C-RT property.
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